I Introduction
The U.S. experience with stagflation in the 1970s was a watershed. The breakdown of a stable empirical Phillips curve relationship ushered in a new emphasis on expectations in macroeconomics. Since that time, sharp oil price increases have continually raised concerns about the risk of stagflation, due to the conventional view that the oil price spikes during the 1970s played a critical causal role in the decade's stagflation.
The interpretation of monetary policy has also been altered through the prism of the To fix terminology, we first turn to the U.S. historical record to provide a definition of stagflation. We identify three key conditions that characterize stagflation: inflation must be relatively high, at least one standard deviation above its long-run average; output must be stagnant, in that it is below trend and worsening relative to trend; and stagflation must be a sufficiently negative event that it lasts longer than a single quarter. Constructing and applying this algorithm to the U.S. data suggests that the United States faced two bouts of stagflation in the postwar era, 1974Q3-1975Q1 and 1980Q2-1980Q3. The stagflation algorithm allows for a more exhaustive analysis of the factors that can generate stagflation than visual analysis alone. Thus, we take the algorithm to a New Keynesian dynamic, stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model featuring optimizing agents and monetary policy that endogenously responds to economic conditions.
In a world subject to shocks to the monetary authority's policy rule and a drifting inflation target, more than 90% of simulations undergo at least one stagflationary episode similar to the U.S. experience during the 1970s and early 1980s. Because the model only has monetary shocks, stagflation is generated by some variant of "go-stop" monetary policy. But the range of go-stop policies that can generate stagflation is diverse, and few go-stop policies ultimately result in stagflation. Drift in the inflation target, by contrast, is an essential feature in generating stagflation. Once this drift is eliminated, monetary policy is unable to generate stagflation through policy rule deviations alone in the baseline model.
Unlike other recent work on the monetary origins of stagflation, learning about the inflation target does not appear to play a key role in generating stagflation. However, when it is very difficult for private agents to disentangle shocks to the inflation target from those to the policy rule, the incidence of stagflation increases and the threat of a drifting inflation target is enough to generate the phenomenon. Thus, limiting monetary policy uncertainty through clearly communicated, credible, and fixed inflation targets would essentially eliminate the possibility of stagflation in the class of models considered here. These results are consistent with Goodfriend's (2012) belief that the Federal Open Market Committee's January 2012 formal adoption of a 2 percent longer-run goal for inflation will assist in preventing the types of go-stop policies conducive to stagflation.
II What Is Stagflation?
Unlike Cagan's (1956) classic definition of hyperinflation, there is not a similar definition of stagflation. While most economists agree that the United States experienced stagflation in the 1970s and early 1980s, there is not agreement on precise start and end dates to the stagflation(s) that occurred during that time nor about the precise conditions that characterize stagflation.
Blinder's (1979) first sentence reads, "Stagflation is a term coined by our abbreviation-happy society to connote the simultaneous occurrence of economic stagnation and comparatively high rates of inflation." Bruno and Sachs ' (1985) introduction states, "The period of 'stagflation'
(stagnation combined with inflation) broke out with a vengeance during 1973-75." Neither work returns to give a more rigorous definition. 
Stagflation in the United States
Without a formal definition for guidance, stagflation appears to be a phenomenon that is known when it is seen. Figure 1 displays data for U.S. GDP growth and inflation from 1970
1 Iain Macleod, who is usually recognized as the creator of the term, defined stagflation as "not just inflation on the one side or stagnation on the other, but both of them together" (Nelson and Nikolov 2004) .
through 1983, measured using fourth-quarter over fourth-quarter growth rates. Real GDP growth was negative for four years during this period-1970, 1974, 1980, and 1982-all However, there are a few years that fall into a gray area in the stagflation spectrum.
Output growth in 1979 had fallen off considerably from the previous year, suggesting a 2 The figure is slightly affected if GDP growth and inflation are computed using annual data instead of using fourthquarter over fourth-quarter percentage changes. In the annual data, GDP growth was negative during four years: 1974, 1975, 1980, and 1982 . GDP growth in 1970 was just barely positive in the annual data. The twin inflation peaks in the annual data both occurred one year later than in the fourth-quarter over fourth-quarter data: inflation was 9.0 percent in 1974 and 9.5 percent in 1975, and it was 9.1 percent in 1980 and 9.4 percent in 1981. The annual data would thus point to 1974-75 and 1980 as stagflationary years. However, the levels of annual data are constructed by taking averages of the year's quarterly numbers, implying that growth rates would be functions of eight quarters. This loss of precision tends to favor the fourth-quarter results in the text. 3 The annual data reinforce the idea that 1973 was not stagflationary: the inflation acceleration from 1972 was milder, going from 4.3 to 5.5 percent; and real GDP growth was even stronger, at 5.8 percent. Separately, labor market indicators suggest little deterioration in the economy in 1973: unemployment held steady near 4.9 percent throughout the year and did not begin to turn up dramatically until mid-1974 mid- . Leamer (2008 percent-a level of inflation that was only half the levels reached later in the decade, but which was nevertheless much higher than rates of approximately 1 percent early in the 1960s. Quarterly inflation was high throughout most of this period. Between 1947Q2 and 2012Q2, the mean annualized quarterly GDP inflation rate was 3.3 percent. Compared with this long-run average, inflation was above average continuously from 1972Q3 through 1983Q1. If we define "high inflation" as an inflation rate more than one standard deviation above its longrun average-in this case, inflation greater than 5.8 percent-then the U.S. experienced high inflation in 1971Q1; 1972Q1; 1973Q2 through 1975Q1; 1975Q3 and 1975Q4; 1976Q4 through 1977Q2; and 1977Q4 through 1981Q4. The output gap was negative during five periods: 1969Q4 to 1972Q1; 1974Q3 to 1977Q1; 1978Q1; 1980Q2 to 1980Q3; and 1981Q4 to 1983Q4. Excluding the singular 1978Q1 observation, the other four periods at least partially coincide with NBER recessions.
If stagflation requires that the economy be stagnant-defined as an output gap that is negative-coupled with high inflation, then we have such an experience in the first quarter in each of 1971, 1972, and 1978; from mid-1974 into 1975; late 1976 into early 1977; and again in 1980. 5 Figure 1 downplays the potentially stagflationary episodes in 1971, 1972, 1976, 1977, and 1978 . Real GDP growth was strong in each of these years, above 4 percent. Moreover, the acceleration in inflation over 1976-78 was coupled with accelerating growth in the economymore in line with the traditional Phillips curve relationship rather than stagflation. Thus, a visual inspection of both the yearly and quarterly data suggests two viable stagflation candidates: 1974-75 and 1980.
A Stagflation Algorithm
The above analysis guides the creation of an algorithm for identifying stagflation in quarterly data that relies on a two-step procedure.
The first step identifies potential stagflation candidates as quarters that satisfy the following three criteria.
(1) Inflation is high: it is at least one standard deviation above its longrun average. (2) Output is stagnant: the output gap is negative, hence output is below trend.
Output is worsening relative to trend: the output gap decreased since the previous quarter. 1974Q3, 1974Q4, 1975Q1, 1980Q2, and 1980Q3. 6 Alternative definitions of the output gap matter in defining stagflation. Figure 4 plots the U.S. data using the Congressional Budget Office's estimate of potential real GDP to derive the output gap. Using the CBO output gap along with inflation in the GDP chain-type price index in the stagflation algorithm produces eight stagflationary quarters: the same five as above (1974Q3-1975Q1 and 1980Q2-1980Q3) , plus 1981Q2 through 1981Q4.
III

A New Keynesian Model
To investigate the monetary origins of stagflation, this paper relies on a relatively standard New Keynesian DSGE model. Monetary policy follows a Taylor-type rule subject to transitory policy shocks, and the monetary authority's inflation target is subject to exogenous time variation. We allow for two cases: one in which economic agents need to learn about the drifting inflation target-which is similar in spirit to recent work on monetary causes of stagflation in Barsky and Kilian (2002) , Williams (2005a, 2005b) , and Knotek (2006)-and an alternative in which agents can perfectly observe movements in the inflation target.
The representative household maximizes expected utility 
The household discounts the future at rate 0<β<1 and potentially faces habit formation in consumption via 0≤γ<1 following Fuhrer (2000) . The parameters σ and η are the coefficient of relative risk aversion and the inverse labor supply elasticity with respect to wages, respectively; ω governs the interest elasticity of real money holdings; and χ and δ are the relative weights placed on the disutility of labor and utility from money holdings, respectively. The household enters the period with money holdings M t−1 and bond holdings B t−1 , with the latter earning the risk free net interest rate i t−1 since the previous period. The household pays the price P t for the composite consumption good, receives nominal wages W t from supplying labor and nominal profits D t from the firms in the economy, and pays net taxes of τ t .
The first order conditions from the household's maximization problem produce a labor supply condition,
a money demand condition,
and the Euler equation,
Necessary and sufficient conditions for household optimization require that (3) through (6) hold in every period, the household's budget constraint binds with equality, the present value of the household's expected expenditures is bounded, and the transversality condition
A continuum of monopolistically competitive firms indexed by j produce intermediate 
where ϕ≥0 measures the adjustment cost in price setting, measured in terms of final aggregate output, and Ψ jt is real marginal cost. As in Ireland (2007) , the parameter 0 1 ξ ≤ ≤ governs the extent to which price setting is backward-or forward-looking. At the extreme value of ξ=1, the firm can costlessly adjust its price in line with last period's inflation, π t−1 . If ξ=0, the firm can costlessly adjust its price in line with expectations of today's steady state inflation target,
The expectation term E t in (7) allows for the possibility that agents do not perfectly know the inflation target at a point in time. 7 The first order condition for the firm's maximization problem implies ( ) 
Government purchases G t are held constant and the government budget constraint clears via lump sum taxation.
7 By contrast, Ireland (2007) assumes agents always know the inflation target.
Monetary policy
The central bank sets monetary policy via the nominal interest rate according to 
the one-step-ahead forecast of the household's perceived inflation target is given by
and the Kalman gain κ is 
IV Monetary Stagflation
To highlight how stagflation arises in the New Keynesian DSGE model presented above, we calibrate the model using relatively standard parameters. Simulations of the baseline model reveal that stagflation is a very common occurrence when the economy is subject to deviations from the monetary policy rule and a drifting inflation target: more than 90% of simulations undergo at least one stagflationary episode similar to the experience in the U.S. during the 1970s and early 1980s. Preventing the inflation target from drifting essentially eliminates the ability of monetary policy to generate stagflation through policy rule deviations alone.
In the baseline model, imperfect information about the monetary authority's inflation target generally does not play an important role in generating stagflation. However, when there is a great amount of policy uncertainty-i.e., when it is very difficult for private agents to disentangle shocks to the inflation target from those to the policy rule-the incidence of stagflation increases and in this case actual drift in the inflation target is not necessary to generate stagflation.
Model Calibration
The model frequency is quarterly. The annual real interest rate in the steady state is 2%, In the model economies, the occurrence of stagflation is the rule rather than the exception: more than 90% of the simulated economies contain at least one stagflationary episode as defined in Section II. On average, between 7 and 9 quarters are classified as stagflationary, generally similar to the range of 5 to 8 stagflationary quarters from the U.S. historical record depending on how the output gap is defined. Monetary policy alone can thus easily generate the key characteristics of stagflation as observed in the United States. This stagflation is achieved in a setting with historically representative volatility in the inflation rate and the policy rate, and with less volatility in the output gap.
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Furthermore, the incidence of stagflation is actually slightly greater for simulated economies in which the inflation target is perfectly observable than when agents need to use a signal-extraction problem. This result runs counter to the previous work that has relied on some type of information imperfections to generate stagflation from monetary policy alone ( 11 Recall that the model was calibrated to match the U.S. data in terms of the volatility of the policy rate and inflation. To the extent that a more volatile environment could serve to create conditions for a temporarily high inflation rate and/or decouple movements in inflation and the output gap, this could artificially increase the likelihood of observing stagflation. Adding real shocks to the model to increase the volatility of the output gap would help the model economies better fit the U.S. data.
the model economies are only subjected to e shocks to the inflation target. 12 Once again, stagflation occurs in the vast majority of model simulations at least once, and the stagflation statistics are only modestly affected. By contrast, lines 5-6 present results when the economies are only subject to shocks to the interest rate target from ε. Without changing any of the intrinsic parameters inside the model, stagflation ceases to occur once the inflation target stops drifting.
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With only monetary shocks in the model, variants of "go-stop policy"-policy easing followed by policy tightening-are behind the emergence of stagflation. We illustrate this phenomenon graphically in Figure 5 for the baseline case with two policy shocks and learning about the inflation target. In particular, we leave the signal-to-noise ratio in the learning case unchanged-so agents always assign a nonzero probability to the possibility of a shock to the interest rate target coming from ε, when in reality these shocks do not occur.
Outside of these episodes, the shocks are essentially mean zero. Panel (b) shows that stagflation is typically preceded by a gradual upward drift in the inflation target coming through a series of above-average e shocks; mechanically, upward drift in the inflation target is necessary to push the inflation rate high enough to satisfy the stagflation 13 We subject the model economies to the same sequences of shocks, hence different shock processes do not drive the result. 14 The figure is similar for the case in which there are two shocks and the inflation target is observable by the private agents. 15 That said, the figure only shows the plus/minus one standard deviation bands; the two standard deviation bands are quite wide, suggesting that there is a wide range of shock combinations that can ultimately deliver stagflation.
criteria set out in Section II. Panel (c) shows that typically the actual stagflation event is coupled with a go-stop set of policy rule deviations.
However, few actual go-stop policy episodes in the simulations produce stagflation. We define a go-stop policy episode using the plus-minus one standard deviation area outlined in Figure 5 in the six quarter window from period −3 to +2. For each of the different cases, we search for sequences of composite monetary shocks u over six consecutive quarters that fall entirely within this pattern. Once a sequence is identified as a go-stop episode, we determine whether a stagflation occurred around this pattern or not. 16 As Table 2 shows, go-stop policy episodes yield stagflation only slightly more than 10% of the time in the cases with two shocks.
Because stagflation does not occur in the cases with only shocks to the interest rate target ε, we define the go-stop policy episodes for these cases from the corresponding cases with both shocks. In spite of being hit with the same sets of ε shocks, these go-stop policy episodes fail to produce any stagflations. Thus, go-stop policy which only takes the form of deviations from a Taylor-type rule rather than incorporating a drifting inflation target fails to generate stagflation.
Alternative Parameterizations
We explore the robustness of the above results to a wide range of model parameterizations. In short, the basic findings-that learning is not necessary to generate stagflation, but a time-varying inflation target is necessary-continue to hold. 16 In particular, while the go-stop episode is defined using a six quarter window, we look over a nine quarter window for stagflations-we look at the three quarters immediately beyond the go-stop window as well. To avoid double counting whether a given go-stop episode generates stagflation or not, if a given sequence of quarters fits the go-stop definition we skip to the end of that sequence before resuming the search for the next go-stop episode. Variations to parameters governing the monetary policy rules are presented in Table 4 .
Moving to the Taylor (1993) By contrast, reducing the persistence of inflation target fluctuations dramatically lowers the incidence of stagflation. Lines 5-6 show the results of going from 0.99 ρ = to 0.7 ρ = , which dramatically reduces the half-life of a target shock from 17 years to 2 quarters. This change essentially eliminates stagflation when there is learning about the inflation target, and the incidence sharply declines when the target is observable as well. A reduction in ρ operates along two margins. Whether there is learning or not, reducing ρ makes shocks to the inflation target more similar to shocks to the interest rate rule as the low frequency movements in inflation disappear, and interest rate shocks by themselves yield extremely few stagflations. But in addition, reducing ρ in the case with learning reduces both the size of the Kalman gain κ and the ratio / κ ρ in absolute terms, which makes expectations of the target stickier via equation (13) and further dampens the model.
Varying the Signal-to-Noise Ratio and the Role of Learning
The final exercise varies the signal-to-noise ratio 2 v σ . For the sake of exposition, Table 5 presents two extreme cases: the first decreases the signal-to-noise ratio by a factor of 50, while the second increases the signal-to-noise ratio by a factor of 50. The changes in the signal-tonoise ratio are achieved by changing the variance of shocks to the inflation target 2 e σ .
Changing the signal-to-noise ratio generates counterfactual volatility in both inflation and the policy rate compared with the U.S. record. Nevertheless, the results shed additional light on how monetary stagflation can arise. Decreasing the signal-to-noise ratio by reducing the variance of inflation target shocks essentially eliminates stagflation (lines 1-2), whether there is learning or not. In essence, this case moves toward the world in which the only shocks are those to the policy rule, and such a world under the baseline model does not generate any stagflation (see Table 1 ). That is, the world becomes less volatile through the decrease in 2 e σ and more certain in the sense that shocks are "known" to be transitory and to the policy rule.
By contrast, increasing the variance of inflation target shocks and thus the signal-to-noise ratio tends to raise the probability of stagflation across the board to virtually 100% of simulations when both shocks are present (lines 3-4). But perhaps more interestingly, stagflation is also now endemic in the model with only ε shocks to the policy rule when private agents need to learn about the inflation target: every simulation suffers from at least one stagflation (line 5), whereas no simulations suffer stagflation when the inflation target is observable (line 6).
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These results suggest that extremely uncertain environments can cause the incidence of stagflation to rise and can help explain why previous work has relied on some type of information imperfection to generate stagflation. Impulse responses assist in highlighting the intuition. Intuitively, imperfect information generates additional persistence in the New
Keynesian model, as well as a certain degree of overshooting as private agents need to learn about the true nature of the shocks they face. Figure 6 shows impulse responses in the baseline model (with its relatively low signal-to-noise ratio, i.e., a small variance of inflation target shocks to policy rule shocks) to a positive ε shock to the interest rate, and Figure 7 shows impulse responses to a negative e shock to the inflation target. 18 The modest overshooting occurs in the case of an ε shock under learning, as inflation remains lower than normal, the monetary authority subsequently eases policy, and output turns slightly positive for a time.
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A highly uncertain environment can amplify this overshooting. Figure 8 shows that a high signal-to-noise ratio (e.g., from a large variance of inflation target shocks to policy rule shocks) and the same initial positive ε shock to the interest rate as before cause inflation to decline sharply while the output gap actually turns positive under learning. Therefore, reversing signs means that a negative ε shock becomes stagflationary in an impulse response exercise-and, as evidenced by the table, it does so frequently in simulations as well. Walking through the stagflation intuition, when private agents see a decline in the policy rate, they place considerable odds on an increase in the inflation target given the large signal-to-noise ratio. This amplifies the movements in actual inflation. Subsequently, the monetary authority seeks to act against the high inflation by reversing course and raising the policy rate-which in turn causes the real rate to oscillate and depresses output. As the monetary authority works to contain inflation through tighter policy, output temporarily worsens relative to trend for a time. Thus, stagflation occurs under elevated uncertainty.
The lack of a stagflation algorithm as proposed in Section II has limited previous studies to identifying stagflation through some type of an impulse response exercise (i.e., visual inspection) such as the one just outlined, rather than using stochastic simulations to identify whether a model generates stagflation as a normal matter of course. Barksy and Kilian (2002) and Orphanides and Williams (2005a) both consider environments with some type of information imperfection on the part of private agents. Barsky and Kilian (2002) propose that if agents are slow to "wake up to" a regime change that takes the form of go-stop monetary policy, this can generate stagflation similar to the U.S. experience. The present paper shows that a regime change is not necessary to generate stagflation from monetary factors; relatively "normal" series of shocks will suffice. 20 20 To the extent that a regime change might produce great uncertainty about the monetary authority's goals-similar to the case in which the signal-to-noise ratio is increased-then such conditions would tend to increase the probability of stagflation. Orphanides and Williams (2005a) assume that agents use finite memory least squares learning to form inflation expectations and that, in response to a particular sequence of inflationary shocks meant to resemble events during the 1970s, stagflation can arise if the monetary authority is too dovish on inflation.
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Taken together, the baseline results and robustness exercises in this paper suggest that stagflation in the spirit of the 1970s is likely a common feature of many New Keynesian DSGE models that allow for both time-varying inflation targets and shocks to a policy rule.
Yet the present paper shows that, even with the monetary authority following stabilizing Taylor-type rules with standard coefficients from the literature, stagflation from monetary factors can still arise.
V Conclusion
This paper examines the phenomenon of stagflation. Using the U.S. historical record, it proposes an algorithm to identify stagflation, and it applies the algorithm to model simulations from a relatively standard New Keynesian DSGE model. The simulations reveal that stagflation may not be as rare as is commonly perceived. In a world subject to shocks to the monetary authority's policy rule and a drifting inflation target, more than 90% of simulations undergo at least one stagflationary episode similar to the U.S. experience during the 1970s and early 1980s.
Preventing the inflation target from drifting essentially eliminates the ability of monetary policy to generate stagflation through policy rule deviations alone.
Whether or not private agents need to learn about the inflation target does not appear to play a key role in the incidence of stagflation. However, when there is a great amount of policy uncertainty-i.e., when it is very difficult for private agents to disentangle shocks to the inflation target from those to the policy rule-the incidence of stagflation increases and in this case actual drift in the inflation target is not necessary to generate stagflation; the threat of a drifting inflation target is enough to generate the phenomenon. Thus, limiting monetary policy uncertainty through credible and fixed inflation targets would reduce or eliminate the possibility of stagflation in the class of models considered here.
The model we consider in this paper is relatively standard and omits key features of the current landscape. Most notably, as we only allow for shocks to the policy rule and the inflation target-both of which, in the real world, may be under the control of the monetary authoritywe omit the zero lower bound on interest rates as a binding constraint. Thus, the key results are likely best interpreted as applying during normal times. Indeed, as one example, Eggertsson (2012) finds that an economy at the zero lower bound may actually benefit from policies that would be counterproductive under regular circumstances, and one proposed solution for exiting and avoiding the zero lower bound calls for either a permanently higher or temporarily higher inflation target (e.g., Blanchard et al. 2010) . We leave the potential stagflationary consequences of such measures, if any, for future research.
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